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ABSTRACT: One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the
texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is
everything. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from
multiple sources. The purpose of this paper will be to attempt to develop an adequate approach to
accounting for this given.
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We often draw information from multiple sources and reason on the basis of this
information. Indeed, the knowledge base for each of us is a highly complex
amalgamation of information from countless sources. So one might ask of two or more
sources—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the sources happen to
contradict each other in some respect, then the answer given by standard logic is
everything. In that case, all of our inferences would be equally worthless, since for every
p we would also infer not-p. But surely it is a given that we often successfully reason
with information from multiple sources that are not entirely consistent with one another
(or even from a single source that contradicts itself). There seem to be two basic
approaches to accounting for this given; they may be distinguished from one another
according to whether inconsistent information (I) is or (II) is not ultimately allowed in the
premise set from which one reasons. In this paper we first briefly consider features and
drawbacks of approach I. Then we develop approach II by articulating strategies for
expunging inconsistent information and try to motivate them by applying them in some
detail to a practical situation.
APPROACH I
Paraconsistent logic
A “paraconsistent” logic is one that abandons the principle that anything follows from
contradictory premises (ex contradictione quodlibet). Graham Priest, the leading
proponent of such logics, cites a number of motivations for them (Priest and Tanaka
2004). The most controversial is his claim that there are “true contradictions,”
propositions p such that p and not-p are both true. Priest and others who accept this claim
seem to think that the main objection to it is that together with classical logic it makes
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every statement true (the danger of “triviality”). Of course, if there are true
contradictions, and not every statement is true, then the world does not obey classical
logic.
In our opinion, Priest has gotten things backwards. The problem with
contradictions is not the danger of triviality, it is that they are contradictions. A theory
from which everything follows is bad because some of those things are false, or worse,
self-contradictory. Quine made a related point years ago, adding that “not” ceases to be
recognizable as negation as soon as some conjunctions of the form “p and not-p” are
regarded as true and taken as not implying everything (1970, p. 81). The proponent of
true contradictions is unlikely to be moved by these considerations, which he will regard
as expressions of prejudice rather than arguments (as if prejudice were always a bad
thing). But we are inclined to agree with David Lewis that attempting to debate this issue
is futile, since debate presupposes common ground, and once one has placed the principle
of non-contradiction in doubt there is no more obvious principle on the basis of which it
could be defended (2004, p.176).
What arguments can be given in favor of true contradictions? Priest appears to put
the greatest weight on the semantic paradoxes, especially the Liar. At first glance, “This
statement is false” implies its own negation and vice versa. Why not take this appearance
at face value and accept that both the statement and its negation are true? It must be
confessed that every solution to this paradox that has been tried comes at some cost to our
naïve intuitions. To take only the most famous example, Tarski concluded that natural
languages either do not contain their own truth predicates or are incoherent. Proponents
of true contradictions have the unenviable task of showing that their solution comes at a
lower cost than the competition, or that it confers greater benefits.
Let us call the alleged existence of true contradictions the “radical” case for
paraconsistent logic. Whatever one may think of the doctrine, it must be admitted that, if
we accept it, the only way we can avoid admitting every statement whatever as true is to
adopt a paraconsistent logic. Other motivations for paraconsistent logic cited by Priest do
not depend upon contradictions’ being literally true, but only on their being, to one
degree or another, unavoidable, at least in certain contexts, where they must be kept from
doing any more damage than necessary. These other motivations constitute what we shall
call the “moderate” case for paraconsistent logic.
For example, a computer may store inconsistent information and be called upon to
draw inferences from this information. A paraconsistent logic, it is claimed, would cut
down on the number of false inferences generated, since it would not license inferring
anything whatever from the contradictions. Whether paraconsistent logics have a
contribution to make here is clearly an empirical, even a technological, question,
possessed of no wider significance.
Priest’s discussion of set theory appears at first to be in service of the moderate
case, but it seems to us in the end to depend upon the radical one. Some early set theorists
(but not, apparently, Cantor) operated on the implicit assumption that every condition on
sets (and perhaps other objects as well) determines a set, the set of all sets (or objects)
that satisfy the condition. This is called the “(unrestricted) comprehension axiom
schema.” If the condition in question is taken to be that of not belonging to itself, this
assumption gives rise to Russell’s Paradox of the set of all sets that do not belong to
themselves: if this set belongs to itself it doesn’t, and if it doesn’t, it does. Priest claims
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that a paraconsistent approach would allow us to infer that it both does and does not
without infecting the rest of the theory. The comprehension axiom schema could thus be
upheld in its unrestricted form, thereby restoring naïve set theory (in one popular sense of
that term).
Since paraconsistent logic is weaker than classical logic, the question naturally
arises how much of set theory can be developed using it. The standard proof of Cantor’s
Theorem, which says that the power set of a set A has greater cardinality than A, begins
by assuming that some set can be mapped onto its power set and deduces a contradiction.
This proof is not available in a paraconsistent logic, and Priest acknowledges in his book
In Contradiction (1987, p. 179) that, as far as he is aware, the theorem may not in fact be
provable using such a logic. This was arguably the theorem that first put set theory on the
map.
Priest seems to think that the possible loss of this and other central theorems of set
theory is made up for by the recovery of naïve set theory, in which there are such things
as the set of all sets. One advantage he claims for this theory is that it could provide a
better model for category theory, a very general and abstract theory of mathematical
structures, than does current set theory. In category theory, the category of all categories
is itself a category, and it is natural to view categories as sets of certain kinds. But current
set theory does not allow a set to be a member of itself. Priest’s naïve set theory does; for
example, the set of all sets is a member of itself. These benefits, however, such as they
are, are provided, not by the use of paraconsistent logic alone, but by the acceptance of
true contradictions. Someone who accepted paraconsistent logic only on the strength of
what we have called the moderate case for it, i.e., as a means of keeping unavoidable
contradictions from doing any more damage than necessary, would surely be reluctant to
embrace a principle, like the comprehension axiom schema, that is known to lead to a
contradiction. After all, we are assuming that such a person still regards contradictions as
bad, and principles that lead to them as false. Moreover, Priest cannot be certain, even
with his safeguards, that his set theory does not imply everything. The paradise that he
believes he has regained may turn out to be a fool’s paradise.
Other instances of inconsistent theories may be seen as more clearly bolstering the
moderate case. In this connection, Priest cites Bohr’s theory of the atom, according to
which an electron orbits the nucleus without radiating energy, contrary to Maxwell’s
equations, which were assumed by the theory. Bohr’s theory was thus inconsistent. “Yet”
notes Priest, “patently, not everything concerning the behavior of electrons was inferred
from it. Hence, whatever inference mechanism it was that underlay it, this must have
been paraconsistent” (Priest and Tanaka 2004, p. 1). This is a non sequitur. By classical
logic, everything follows from Bohr’s theory, assuming that Priest’s description of it is
accurate. That does not mean that everything was in fact inferred from it. The
information we are given concerning Bohr’s theory underdetermines the logic that was in
fact employed to derive inferences from it. We are not aware of any false inferences
Frege drew from the axioms of the Grundgesetze, but we know that Russell’s paradox
followed from one of them. Does this show that the logic that underlay the Grundgesetze
must have been paraconsistent? It is clear that Frege regarded this logic, which, after all,
he stated explicitly, as classical.
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Defeasibility logic
The moderate case for paraconsistent logic may equally be taken to lend support to a
somewhat different variety of alternative logic. Lord Keynes, when criticized for altering
his opinions, replied “When the facts change, I change my mind—what do you do, sir?”
“Defeasibility logic” emphasizes the dynamic aspect of knowledge and belief. Since we
modify our beliefs on the basis of new information, defeasibility logicians hold that we
employ “nonmonotonic” reasoning, in which the addition of further premises can
invalidate conclusions previously drawn (cf., for example, Kyberg and Teng 2001, p.
117).
It is well-known that inductive reasoning is nonmonotonic. But defeasibility logic
has also been proposed as an alternative to classical deductive logic for dealing with
inconsistent information. A favorite example in the literature goes as follows. Initially the
information base includes the proposition that Tweety is a bird. In the absence of any
contrary information in the base, it can be inferred that Tweety can fly. Here, the classical
notion of logical consequence is replaced by a mere requirement of consistency
governing inferences: if x has the property A (or properties A1–An), and if it is consistent
with what is known to assume that x also has the property B, then it can be inferred that x
has the property B. So, if further propositions containing contrary information were
added to the information base, for example, that Tweety is a penguin and penguins cannot
fly, then the original conclusion would have to be “retracted” and the contradictory
conclusion can be inferred, viz., that Tweety cannot fly (e.g., Reiter 1980, p. 81ff.; Kyberg
and Teng 2001, pp. 119-120; Prakken and Vreeswijk 2002, p. 219ff.; Ferguson 2003, pp.
337-338).
This brief synopsis and illustration of the approach taken by defeasibility logics is
instructive in that it indicates the kinds of problems that fuller accounts must wrestle
with. Surely the most glaring is, as Ferguson puts it, that, “it is simply not intuitive that
B(x) follows from A(x) merely because the two statements are consistent!” (2003, p.
339). After all, that standard would often leave us free to “infer” either p or not-p as we
see fit. What kind of inference is that?
There are also difficulties in applying such a logic. Granted that we are permitted
to retract conclusions on the basis of new information, we still face
the problem of which conclusions we are to retract and how we are going to accomplish it [,which]
is by no means an easy one. A conclusion can be supported by multiple monotonic or
nonmonotonic derivations, and it can also be supporting the derivation of other conclusions
(Kyberg and Teng 2001, p. 120n, cf. p. 131; also see Oaksford and Hahn 2006, p. 247)

In their discussion of an example that is basically parallel to the Tweety case above,
Prakken and Vreeswiljk (2002) find “two conflicting arguments,” (corresponding to the
argument that Tweety can fly and the argument that Tweety cannot fly above.) But they
acknowledge that from “the point of view of FOL [first order logic],” one should “have
refused to accept one of the premises” (p. 221) or effected “a reinterpretation of a
premise” (p. 222). The premise in question corresponds to birds can fly, which is only
implicit in the defeasible reasoning, and the “reinterpretation” is the proposition that some
birds can fly, which leads to the conclusion that possibly, Tweety can fly. From this point
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of view, there is no conclusion that needs to be retracted even given the addition of
Tweety is a penguin and penguins cannot fly to the information base.
Has anyone in the real world ever been tempted to reason even only implicitly
from a premise like birds can fly without first attempting to disambiguate it? Does it
mean that some birds can fly? Maybe Tweety is one who can’t. That all birds can? Then
Tweety certainly can too, but who would accept the premise? In the context given, it
seems to mean that any bird that fits a certain stereotype (which does not include
penguins) can fly. But if you put it that way, you will not be tempted to infer that Tweety
can fly unless you have reason to believe that Tweety fits the stereotype. If we appear to
belabor a single unfortunately chosen example, we reply that the literature on these logics
is full of such sentences. They seem to constitute its prime motivation. Other examples of
such premises include academics are unfit and runners are fit (Oaksford and Hahn 2006,
p. 247).
A more technical drawback is that such logics are not “semidecidable” (Kyberg
and Teng 2001, p. 147). This is just another way of saying that the consequences of a set
of premises are not recursively enumerable. In contrast, classical first order logic is
semidecidable in that for any formula within it, to determine whether the formula is
provable, there is an algorithm that terminates if the formula is provable (this is the
decidability); but there is no assurance of a terminating algorithm if the formulas is not
provable (this is the undecidability). Undecidability particularly besets defeasibility
logics because in performing the consistency check, all the exceptions inherent in the
situation (such as Tweety’s being a penguin or Tweety’s being an ostrich in the example
above, as initially described) must be not provable. But there no effective way of showing
this.
A good case can be made that logic is a priori and unrevisable. But even if one is
open in principle to revising one’s logic, as Quine famously was, it should surely be
contemplated only as a last resort, after everything else has been tried. This was the
upshot of Quine’s “web of belief” metaphor. In the face of an inadequacy or mismatch
between one’s beliefs relative to the world, one should attempt to revise beliefs or
theories at the empirical periphery of the web and work one’s way inward only as
necessary. Powerful justifications would be required for altering the centermost region
where logic resides. Imposing novel logics as a way of handling inconsistent beliefs is
like breaking a butterfly upon a wheel.
APPROACH II
Such theoretical considerations incline us to take approach II in accounting for reasoning
with potentially inconsistent information, whereby inconsistent information is not
ultimately allowed in the premise set. A curious fact is that in at least one area where
logic is practically applied, we feel that one is forced (whether theoretically inclined to it
or not) to take approach II. This seems to provide evidence that approach I—whereby
inconsistent information is ultimately allowed in the premise set from which one
reasons—may be inherently implausible.
The area of practical application is that of high-stakes and highly visible
standardized testing. We will focus on the United States-Canadian (and soon to be,
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Australian) Law School Admission Test (LSAT), 1 but our remarks pertain essentially
equally well to reading and reasoning questions on such tests as the Graduate Record
Examinations (GRE), the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT), the Graduate
Management Admission Test (GMAT), and the SAT.
The problem of reasoning with potentially inconsistent information arises most
vividly on the LSAT in a question type called Comparative Reading, which is being
introduced on the test in June 2007 (the question type is similar to “paired passages” on
the SAT). In a Comparative Reading set there are two reading passages followed by five
to eight questions, most of which concern how the two passages relate to one another. In
Comparative Reading there tends to be a premium placed on passages that oppose one
another. This is useful for generating test questions, since it lets us ask about their points
of agreement and disagreement. It also has construct and face validity for the study of
law: In law there is often conflicting material to deal with, such as conflicting judicial
opinions or inconsistent witness accounts of the same event.
So for such a pair of opposing passages, suppose that a question simply asks:
(1) Which one of the following statements can be inferred from the two passages taken
together?
Then we could be in serious trouble if the two passages contradict each other in some
respect, because an examinee could challenge the test question on the grounds that it has
no single correct answer: every answer choice is correct, i.e., can be inferred. The
examinee’s challenge would be presupposing classical or standard logic whether or not
the examinee knew it (compare the riposte that takes the form “if absurdity x is the case,
then I’m a monkey’s uncle”). But the telling point is, we could not defend the test
question against this challenge by any sort of appeal to paraconsistent or defeasibility
logic as more accurate logic than classical logic. For one thing, it would be unfair to the
examinee to expect him or her to have and to apply any particular training in logic; such
preparation is not a stated prerequisite for any of the standardized tests mentioned above.
Moreover, if the challenge went to an outside panel of experts (such panels often include
informal logicians) for adjudication, we think that we would lose and thereby suffer the
embarrassment and expense of having to rescore the test. The underlying reason for all of
this seems to be that ordinary thinking deeply embodies classical logic, whether or not it
is ever consciously attended to, and therefore mature reasoners can generally be held to
account (by such standardized tests) for reasoning by its principles, not some more exotic
set of principles.
There appear to be certain strategies employed in everyday reasoning with
potentially inconsistent information from multiple sources, strategies that are designed to
expunge any inconsistent information. These strategies include: 2
1

The Central European University also uses the LSAT. Countries such as Japan and Romania have been
allowed to “copy the blueprint” for the LSAT.

2

Some of these strategies have affinities with some of those discussed by Woods (2003, esp. pp. 99-200).
We focus on seemingly common strategies that are also useful in developing Comparative Reading for the
LSAT, unlike, for example, the strategy where a person is “faced with a (noticed) contradiction in his
belief-stock,” and he “quickly forget[s] that it is there if it seems harmless and inessential to any of his
cognitive tasks at hand” (Woods 2003, p. 99).
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(A) The “reinterpretation of a premise” as in the Tweety case discussed above, that is,
revising specific propositions in the premise set as necessary to eliminate any
contradiction.
(B) Considering the largest intersection of consistent statements expressed by the
different sources.
(C) Recognizing that our primary data in dealing with multiple sources of information
take the form of attributed or propositional attitude statements like ‘Source x says that p’,
not simply the proposition or statement p. This enables taking sources distributively
rather than collectively.
(D) Narrowing the sets of statements from which the inference is supposed to be drawn
from whole books or articles or passages to statements relevant to a particular topic.
(E) Treating as inductive phenomena (involving both confirming and disconfirming
evidence) situations that otherwise might be treated as involving contradictions or that
paraconsistent logic treats as deductive. 3
A variation of strategies (A) and (B) in developing Comparative Reading for the
LSAT is carefully checking the two passages in their entirety and perhaps making some
revisions to ensure that they do not contradict each other in any respect. In doing this one
must not go overboard and see contradictions where there are none. For example, in
situations where inductive logic applies, there can be both confirming and disconfirming
evidence with respect to the same thing—without there being any contradiction, e.g., in
drug trials 4 (this invokes strategy (E)). The fact is that in reading and comparing multiple
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In discussing Priest’s 1987, Smith (1991, p. 382) says: “Priest supplies further examples of ‘positive facts’
which supposedly force us to accept the truth and falsity of a statement. These examples always involve
two different pieces of evidence alternatively confirming and disconfirming that statement. For example, he
points out that two different means of measuring temperature can supply evidence for inconsistent
statements about the temperature of an object. . .But only one type of confirming evidence can be taken as
proof of the truth of a statement: deductive inference from premises of which we are apodeictically certain.
. .If inductive confirmation is not proof that a statement is true, a fortiori, confirmation of both a sentence
and its negation by different pieces of evidence cannot be accepted as proof that a statement can be both
true and false. . .In fact, the tension between confirmation and consistency that arises in such cases is
precisely what makes them vital to scientific discovery. For example, inconsistent temperature reading
obtained by what are believed to be reliable methods would rightly be taken by the scientists involved as
warranting a renewed investigation into the physics of temperature [strategy A]. Priest’s theory would
counsel our removing this tension in certain cases by accepting the mutually inconsistent statements as true
and using his logic to explore the content of the theory containing them.”

4

Again, Priest seems not to take adequate account of this possibility. He says, “suppose I am playing cards
and have some reason to believe the dealer to be honest. Despite this, at a crucial time, he is dealt a perfect
hand. The two hypotheses are now that a) the dealer cheated: my belief that he was honest was wrong; and
b) the dealer is honest and the improbable has happened by sheer chance. How one might go about deciding
between these hypotheses, though in practice a sensitive issue, is in principle clear enough. One may in the
end, have to accept that one was just unlucky. Similarly, if in the end there is no satisfactory way the
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texts it may be critical for understanding to see how they compliment each other—to see
how they are more informative or persuasive considered jointly than they are considered
separately. Moreover, sometimes a larger set of statements simply will allow more
challenging or sophisticated inferences than a smaller set. So the kind of task evoked by
question stem (1) is a valid reading comprehension task, and the attempt is made to
accommodate it in Comparative Reading on the LSAT.
Alternatively, this kind of question stem could be used in Comparative Reading:
(2) Which one of the following statements can be inferred from each of the passages?
This question means that one is supposed to consider each passage independently of the
other and determine whether on its own it supports a given statement. Since one is not
supposed to combine in any way the statements of one passage with those of the other, it
does not matter if the two passages contradicted each other in some respect. In contrast,
question stem (1) explicitly tells one to take the two passages together. In other words,
question stem (2) reads distributively where question stem (1) reads collectively (strategy
(C)). For example, if one passage argues that global warming is human-caused and the
other passage argues that it is not human-caused, an inference as per (2) from each
passage might be that the artic icecap is shrinking (given what the passages say
otherwise).
Still imagining that the passage pair is about global warming, another kind of
question is exemplified by (3):
(3) The statements in the passages about worldwide temperature records most strongly
support which one of the following generalizations?
Question stem (3) narrows the sets of statements from which the inference is supposed to
be drawn from whole passages to statements relevant to a particular topic—worldwide
temperature records. Even more specifically, perhaps, it narrows the sets to those
statements that support some generalization about this particular topic. This narrowing or
focusing makes it less likely that the sets will contain statements that contradict each
other (strategy (D)). Relatively speaking, question stem (1) is completely unfocused.
In addition, the fact that for (3) the inference is a matter of generalizing and the
fact that the evidence is characterized as most strongly supporting the generalization
indicate that the inference is supposed to be inductive (or nondeductive). For (3) the task
is to go from scattered temperature data to a general statement, such as that the global
average temperature has risen over the past century. Since the problem of ex
contradictione quodlibet pertains only to deductive inference, it would be uncooperative
for the examinee to read question stem (3) as allowing anything to follow if the relevant
passage material turned out to harbor a contradiction. Nevertheless, since technically a
full degree of support (valid deduction) is still support (support at the high limit), this
strategy, like the narrowing one, does not necessarily get the test developer out of the
woods.
Variations on preceding kinds of question stems include the following:
contraction can be avoided, one may one may have to accept that the domain in question contains
dialetheias” (1987, p. 132).

8

REASONING FROM CONFLICTING SOURCES

(4) The authors of the two passages would be most likely to disagree over whether
(5) Which one of the following is most strongly supported by information common to
both passages?
For (4) the examinee is supposed to consider the particular claim in the answer choice
and determine whether one author would think that it is true, and the other author think
that it is false. This (distributive task) involves inferring the view of each author on a
particular topic based on what is said in the respective passage. Needless to say, there is
no problem of ex contradictione quodlibet in different people holding contradictory views
(“p and not-p” is the form of a contradiction, not “X believes that p and Y believes that
not-p”). The examinee is not by any means supposed to combine the two views into one
(inconsistent) view. Of course one or more of the other strategies would have to be
brought to bear if one happened to accept both sources as authoritative.
For (5) the examinee is supposed to consider which particular claim among the
answer choices is most strongly supported by information that is shared between both
passages (the information intersection). This narrows the information to be considered
from all the information conveyed by either passage (the information union), and so
makes it less likely that there will be an internal conflict in the information to be
considered. Finally, note that the terminology of “most likely” in (4) and “most strongly
supported” in (5) suggest that the inference is supposed to be inductive.
link to commentary
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